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Abstract 
critics have repeatedly charged that the orthodox 
£ormulation of the orthodox doctrine of the incarnation 
is logically incoherent. Several conservative writers 
have responded in various ways. Norman Geisler predicateds 
logically incompatible attributes of Christ to his two 
natures. Millard Erickson relies on his version of the 
kenosis strategy. Thomas Morris formulates a two-minds 
model. Ronald Leigh steps out of the boundaries of 
orthodoxy and suggest a one-natured Christ. All of these 
views appear to suffer from various inadequacies. The 
best formulation of the incarnation doctrine is that of 
Kierkegaard's Absolute Paradox. 
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Is "Truly man, Truly God" Trul Coherent? 
Orthodoxy throughout the ages has consistently affirmed 
both the complete humanity of Christ as well as his complete 
divinity. The early Church councils through a process both 
complex and arduous hammered out phrases contemporary 
theologians thought most consistent with the biblical record 
as well as prevailing categories of thought for that day. 
Nicaea stated "We believe ... in one Lord Jesus Christ. 
true God of true God. . begotten but not made, of one 
sUbstance with the Father" (Bettenson, 1963, p. 35). 125 
years later Chalcedon reaffirmed these same propositions 
and expanded the idea in significant ways. In subsequent 
theology down to the present, these creeds have constituted 
the basic orthodox position concerning the identity of 
Christ. 
As difficult it was to state the above propositions, 
making sense of them has proved even more laborious. It has 
been said, somewhat tongue in cheek perhaps, that no 
orthodox doctrine of the incarnation exists, and every 
attempt to establish one has been condemned as heresy. The 
problems of yesterday have changed drastically, but the 
challenge has not. In this century the debate over 
christology has flared anew, on several different levels. 
One of the most oft heard accusations revolves around the 
coherency of the orthodox interpretation , or lack of it. 
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Critics claim that the notion of Jesus as fully God as well 
as fully man is absurd and nonsensical. It is common fare 
among contemporary theologains to dismiss the idea of divine 
incarnation as incoherent. The charge is usually formed by 
a series of allegations beginning with the actual word 
incoherent and followed by a number of synonyms. For 
instance, a theologian might say that the idea of a man 
having both a nature fully divine and fully human is 
incoherent, 
impossible. 
irrational, nonsensical, absurd, and logically 
John Hick, one of the most outspoken critics of 
the traditional doctrine of the incarnation, wrote 
[The statement that Jesus was God incarnate] can hardly 
be literal, factual statement, 
thousand years of Christian 
since after nearly two 
reflection no factual 
content has been discerned in it. . For the reason 
why it has never been possible to state a literal 
meaning for the idea of incarnation is simply that it 
has no literal meaning (1980, p.74). 
In response to this attack, several philosophers have 
stepped forward to defend the doctrine of the incarnation, 
and often they have taken different approaches to the 
problem. Most of these are attempting to work wi thin the 
Chalcedon formula, yet this is not always the case. In the 
following analysis, we are going examine and evaluate the 
work of five different authors in three categories. The 
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first category is coherency. These philosophers and 
theologians attempt to present various formulations of 
the incarnation which meet two crucial criteria. First, 
it must be a logically sound defense, otherwise it is no 
defense at all. Second, it must be compatible with the 
traditional christology of the church, specifically as 
it is drawn out in the Chalcedonian creed. The writers 
inculded under this category are Norman Geisler, Millard 
J. Erickson, and Thomans v. Morris. Because Erickson 
offers a type of kenotic christology, we will examine 
kenoticism breifly before turning to Erickson's exact 
formulation. 
The second category is reformulation. The sole 
representative presented in this paper is Ronald Leigh. 
Leigh attempts to do justice to the biblical record, yet 
does not see Chalcedon as adequate. He believes we 
reorder the doctrine of the incarnation on grounds 
biblical and rational. 
must 
both 
The final category is paradox. Again, we have only 
one representative, namely Soren Kierkegaard, yet under 
this heading we could likely place a large part of the 
theologians, if not most, in the tradition of the church 
who have called the reality of the incarnation a divine 
mystery. However, Kierkegaard's treatment is quite unique, 
and he will be the focus of our study. 
Coherency 
Norman L. Geisler 
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Al though a very prolific writer, Norman Geisler has 
not given as much attention to the logical compatibility 
of the incarnation as other areas of conservative Christian 
concerns. However, we will consider his formulation because 
of his importance as an evangelical apologist. 
Before looking at his defense of the incarnation 
proper, it will be beneficial to examine how Geisler 
responds to any denial of the law of non-contradiction 
in our theology or philosophy. A perfect example is his 
strong and immediate reaction to John V. Dahms, who boldly 
declared that an "absolute and unconditional commitment 
to the law of contradiction [among evangelicals] is quite 
surprising" (1978, p. 370). Dahms argues for the existence 
of logical contradictions within Scripture as well as other 
areas (pp. 370-374). He goes on to say that 
what we have called contradictions in Christian 
doctrine are often referred to as paradoxes. 
[meaning that] If we only had the knowledge that God 
has we would perceive that no logical contradiction 
is involved. But if so, how is it known that in the 
light of God's knowledge that there is no logical 
contradiction: Only on the assumption that no logical 
contradiction is universally applicable (p. 375). 
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Dahms argues that an a priori commitment to the law of non-
_ contradiction is not valid, and only by assuming it can we 
call paradoxes merely apparent contradictions. Although 
Geisler is not always fair in his treatment of Dahms, he 
stresses the point that merely to say that the law of non-
contradiction does not apply to God is a "logical (i.e. non-
contradictory) statement about God. Hence it is self-
defeating" (1979, p. 58). 
Attempting to circumvent this criticism, Dahms develops 
his own epistomology. Using Chalcedon as his springboard, 
he proposes a Trini tarian epistomology in which "rational 
propositions, empirical observation, and aesthetic 
appreciation are all involved in correct understanding" 
(1979, p. 377). Dahms does not deny logic categorically, 
but attempts to limit it to the sphere of the nominal, or 
being, whereas the verbal or becoming is not bound by the 
norms of logic. 
In response to this attempt Geisler vigorously accuses 
Dahms of special pleading; "why should we grant this special 
exception from inconsistency, and not every non-Christian 
who wishes to beg the same exceptions from contradictions in 
his view" (1979, p. 153). Indicative of Geisler's antipathy 
toward such an epistomological suggestion as Dahms makes are 
his criticisms which at times almost fall to the personal 
level. 
f 
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Clearly then it is important for Geisler to be able to 
deflect the charge of logical inconsistency as it is leveled 
at the incarnation, and in particular the formulation of 
Chalcedon. He sees only three options available to 
evangelicals if the doctrine has no more logical foundation 
than the idea of a square circle: 1) give up the faith, 2) 
reconstruct the doctrine of the incarnation, or 3) abandon 
the noncontradictoriness of reality (Geisler & Watkins, 
1985, p. 185). 
Geisler's task would appear to be most difficult, 
especially considering his list of attributes predicated to 
Christ. As to his humanity he posses finitude, 
contingency, ontological dependence, mutability, spatiality, 
temporali ty, and complexity. However, as to his deity, 
Christ possess all the logical complements or opposites of 
these quali ties; infini tude, necessi ty, ontological 
independence, immutability, nonspatiality, eternality, and 
simplici ty (1988, p. 308, and Geisler & Watkins, 1985 p. 
188) . 
Certain definitions are important to Geisler's 
strategy. Attempting to explicate the meaning of Chalcedon, 
the words ousia and persona are extremely important, 
al though it is not certain Geisler gives them the same 
meaning the Fathers intended. Qusia or nature "denotes the 
quali ties, attributes, or properties of a thing which are 
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necessary to it" (Geisler & Watkins, 1985, p. 189). Nature 
_ is the set of characteristics without which a thing could 
not possibly be what it is, its essence or its objectivity. 
The person (persona) of a thing cannot be confused with 
the nature. This aspect of a thing is the "willing and 
intending non-objective center in a nature, the subjective 
center of relational activity subsisting or cohering in an 
objective essence" (Geisler & Watkins, 1985, p. 190). 
What Chalcedon affirms is two natures in one person, 
and for Geisler it is crucial that we not equate the two 
natures with the one person, nor the one person with the two 
natures. Christ's person cannot be separated from his 
natures, but it must be distinguished to avoid incoherency 
(Geisler & Watkins, 1985, p. 191). 
Having thus defined the terms critical to the 
Chalcedonian creed, Geisler turns toward the charge of 
logical contradiction. The accusation states that it is a 
violation of the law of noncontradiction to affirm that any 
being possessed both the attributes of (for example) 
infitude and finitude at the same time. However, this falls 
short on two accounts. First, it is not enough to claim 
that affirming A and non-A at the same time is a 
contradiction. A contradiction is manifest only when A and 
non-A are affirmed in the same time and in the same sense or 
respect (Geisler & Watkins, 1985, p. 192). Second, the word 
being must be clarified. 
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It is not certain whether it 
.refers to nature or person. Chalcedon, however, does not 
affirm contradictory attributes to one person at the same 
time and in the same sense. 
Christ is both infinite in one nature and finite in 
another nature at the same time. And because 
infinitude and finitude are predicated of two different 
natures that are united in one person yet without 
mixture or confusion, no contradiction is involved (p. 
193) . 
Therefore, by arguing that Chalcedon predicates the 
contradictory attributes to different natures, Geisler hopes 
to overturn the charge of logical incoherence. As long as 
the natures are kept "without confusion, mixture, or 
division," the statement applying these two natures to one 
person in non-contradictory (p. 195). He concludes: 
It would be contradictory to affirm that there is only 
one nature in Christ which possesses mutually exclusive 
attributes (such as created and uncreated, changeable 
and unchangeable). But this contradiction is avoided 
when we affirm that there are two different natures in 
this one person. This is a mystery but not a 
contradiction (Geisler, 1988, p. 311). 
Although Geisler has made some useful clarifications, one 
wonders if his solution has really done anything about the 
problem. 
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He is obviously right to say that it is self-
contradictory to affirm attributes of a nature as well as 
their logical complements, and appears to be correct in 
claiming that Chalcedon does not do this. However, an 
indi vidual comprised of both a person and a nature must 
exemplify that set of properties which constitutes its 
nature, and if it has two natures, it must exemplify both 
sets of attributes. It does not seem possible for an 
indi vidual to have one or more sets of attributes without 
exemplifying those attributes. I f an individual entity is 
both fully God and fully man, it must possess all the 
attributes essential to that classification. Therefore this 
entity must exemplify both attributes essential to divinity 
and attributes essential to humanity, and as we have already 
seen Geisler defines these two sets of attributes as logical 
complements of the other. 
Geisler responds to this charge by saying each 
attribute is not attributed to the same entity, namely 
Christ, at the' same time and in the same sense. What he 
means by this is that each contradictory attribute is 
attributed to a different nature, not the same person. 
However, we may merely repeat our charge. Christ must 
exemplify all his essential attributes regardless of whether 
they subsist in two distinct natures or no. This results in 
a Christ who exemplifies two (or more) properties which are 
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logically contradictory. It is not contradictory to affirm 
that Christ had two natures with two sets of attributes. 
Yet it is still every bit as problematic to say that Christ, 
exemplified infinitdue and finitude regardless of what 
nature they are predicated to. 
The entire attempt is more an exercise in semantics than a 
formidable defense of the incarnation. 
Kenosis and Millard J. Erickson 
In dealing with the incarnational problem we are 
examining, the kenotic theories have a long and well-known 
history in the past two hundred years. The touch-stone of 
kenoticism is the christological hymn of Phillipians 2:6-11, 
especially verse seven, which speaks of Christ emptying 
himself. Basic to this idea is that in becoming human, 
the Second Person of the Trinity divested himself of certain 
divine qualities which would have excluded Christ from 
genuine humanity. However, in explaining what this 
involves, kenotic theologians have produced a variety of 
answers. 
Peter T. Forsyth offered a good representative kenotic 
theology. Some formulations of kenosis involved the 
surrender of several divine attributes, usually those such 
as omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence. This invited 
the very serious question of whether such an individual 
could be counted as truly God. In response, Forsyth claimed 
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that Christ did not loose his divine attributes, but they 
. wi thdrew from actual qualities to potential qualities. He 
states that "potentiality is only actuality powerfully 
condensed" (1909, p. 303). He goes on to explain 
Here we have not so much the renunciation of 
attributes, nor their conscious possession and 
concealment, as the retraction of their mode of being 
from actual to potential. 
like omniscience, are not 
reduced to a potentiality. 
(p.308). 
. The attributes of God, 
destroyed when they are 
They are only concentrated 
These attributes became actual again over time, and this 
process culminated at the cross and the resurrection (Wells, 
1984, p. 137). 
This type of construction is of course open to the 
theist, but there may be good reasons for rej ecting it. 
Morris finds kenoticism in general inadequate for those who 
desire to maintain an exalted view of the divine attributes, 
i.e. for those standing in the Anselmian or Thomistic 
tradition. Two reasons support this hesitation. First, on 
a basic understanding of the divine attributes, "it requires 
a view of the modalities of those attributes which seems 
unsatisfactory" (1986, p. 93) . For example, many 
theologians would claim that God is not only omnipotent, but 
he is necessarily omnipotent. It cannot be the case that 
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God just happens to be omnipotent (or exemplify any other 
attribute in such a manner), he must be essentially 
omnipotent. "No individual can temporarily give up a 
property he has essentially" (p. 94). Kenosis cannot handle 
this modally exalted view of deity. 
The second reason for rejecting kenosis is that "on the 
same condition it necessitates abandoning any substantive, 
metaphysical ascription of immutability to God" (Morris, 
1986, p. 93). Morris stresses that this is true not only 
for a more extreme statement of immutability but even for a 
more moderate one. The interpretation of this attribute 
ascirbed by Morris is 
a property, or modality, of the exemplification of all 
those attributes constitutive of deity, kind-essential 
for di vini ty. In brief, any individual who has a 
constitutive attribute of deity can never have begun to 
have it, and can never cease to have it. He has it, 
rather, immutably (p. 97). 
To get around this, kenotic theologians would have to make 
ingenious maneuvers which would push the bounds of 
credibili ty to their limit. Morris sees kenoticism as a 
possibility, but an unnecessary and undersirable one. 
It may appear that the christology of Forsyth noted 
above avoids these criticism on the grounds that the Logos 
does not surrender his attributes. Rather, they become 
r 
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compacted from actuality to potentiality. However, we may 
wonder if having an attribute potentially means anything 
other than having the potential to exemplify an attribute 
one does not currently have. 
In his book The Word Became Flesh (1991), Erickson 
attempts to use a modified formulation of the kenotic 
christology to bring at least a feasible degree of logical 
consistency to the incarnation. Erickson is sensi ti ve to 
the criticisms of Thomas Morris related to the kenotic 
strategy. In order to circumvent these weaknesses, Erickson 
proposes a kenosis of addition, by which he means that the 
incarnation involved not a loss of divine characteristics, 
but the appropriation of human ones. 
Rather than suggest that God gave up certain attributes 
of divinity ... I prefer to emphasize that what he did 
in the incarnation was to add something to each nature, 
namely, the attributes of the other nature. He 
still had divine attributes, but they were exercised in 
connection with the humanity which he had assumed (p. 
555) • 
What Christ surrendered in the Phillipians passage was not 
his attributes but his glory. His humiliation consists of 
what he took on rather than gave up. This observation 
follows the text of verse seven very closely, and therefore 
has much to commend it. 
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Before discussing how this relates to the various 
attributes specifically, Erickson first makes some important 
qualifications. He asks us to distinguish between deity in 
abstraction and humanity in abstraction on the one hand, and 
dei ty in incarnation and humanity in incarnation on the 
other. Neither of the two natures is essentially altered by 
fact of the incarnation, but each affects the other in a 
reciprocal relation. "We are suggesting that the two sets 
of qualitites which the one subject or self, Jesus, 
possessed functioned together in such a way that the 
manifestation of each now was different from the 
manifestation of either one alone" (1991, p. 556). 
In conjunction with this distinction, Erickson further 
proposes a differentiation between active and latent 
attributes. How is the divine nature affected by the human 
in the incarnation? Most significantly, several qualities 
active in abstract deity become latent in incarnated deity. 
"God's knowledge of all things may have been limited in 
actual exercise by his consciousness I being related to a 
human personality and particularly to a human brain" (1991, 
p. 556). 
From this basis, Erickson begins to explicate how 
various divine properties could be predicated to Christ 
along with properties normally thought of as contradictory. 
His first attempt deals with omniscience and is particularly 
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interesting. The infinte range of divine knowledge possessed 
,by Christ was located in his unconscious. We may know many 
things without thinking about them at any given time, yet 
recall them from our subconscious with effort, sometimes 
very little and at other times only after much exertion. In 
a similar manner the full knowledge of all truth remained 
located in Christ's unconscious, yet he was permitted access 
to this not by exerting his own will but only as permitted 
by the Father. 
Likewise, Jesus possessed full omnipotence, yet only 
had this ability latently. "He possessed and exercised it 
in connection with the presence of a fully human nature" 
(1991, p. 560). Like omniscience, the exertion of this 
attribute remained the complete purogati ve of the Father. 
Erickson speculates that Jesus was probably not aware of 
having this attribute during most of his life. 
The attribute of omnipresence is an obvious problem for 
any model of the incarnation. This quality Erickson defines 
as "not limited to any particular place and time" (p. 561). 
If he means this as opposed to "being everywhere all the 
time," then the definition has the advantage of not limiting 
God to being everywhere; it gives him the freedom to be at 
one particular place. It is not explicitly clear that this 
is what he means, however. In another place, Erickson 
affirms that God is everywhere (Christian Theology, 1983, 
r 
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p. 273), but he does not state where God is necessarily 
everywhere, which would seem to limit God to the state of 
being everywhere. Erickson ends the discussion simply be 
saying omnipresence was a capacity Christ chose not to exert 
for a period of time. 
Erickson then attempts to deal with concerns the 
temptation of Christ, a well known and well worked-over 
difficul ty. Erickson concludes that in order to remain 
faithful to the biblical record, we must conclude that Jesus 
could indeed have sinned. 
for God cannot sin, nor 
How does this affect his deity, 
even be tempted (James 1:13)? 
Erickson proposes that on the very brink of the decision to 
sin, the Second Person of the Trinity would have withdrawn 
from the human nature, and the incarnation would be thus 
dissolved. 
Erickson's final discussion relates to the death of 
Jesus on the cross. How can it be that God should die? The 
solution lies in rejecting the traditional body/soul duality 
in favor of contingent monism. This view of human nature 
sees an individual human as capable of existing in either a 
physical and material state, or a non-physical and 
immaterial state. "Death" is the term used to describe the 
transition from the material to immaterial state, but humans 
in a sense do not really die according to contingent monism 
(1991, p. 565). Therefore the divine Logos did not die on 
r 
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the cross, but transferred from one form of existence to 
-another. 
Erickson's presentation certainly goes much farther 
than Geisler's and has many strengths to commend it. Rather 
than simply ascribe the divine attributes to the divine 
nature and the human attributes to the human nature and 
considering the work done, Erickson actually attempts to 
draw out how the two natures might be related. 
Yet it does not appear that his solution is fully 
satisfactory. He begins by avoiding the problem of claiming 
God gave up any of his properties in becoming incarnate, and 
thus does justice to the modality of divine attributes. 
However, in spelling out exactly how this is possible, he 
runs into several difficulties. He does not cover all the 
range of divine attributes which could propose difficulties, 
such as immutability, eternality, and necessity. These last 
two he mentions in connection with the death of Jesus, yet 
he does not handle them explicitly. The qualities of 
immutability and eternality very often are given different 
meanings in different theologies. Erickson does not discuss 
how he views these attributes. Is immutability the quality 
of complete changlessness and passionlessness in the 
Godhead? Or is it less strong, as Morris suggested above. 
Does eternality imply total timelessness, or an everlasting 
God who does experience time? How Erickson answers these 
Incarnation 
21 
questions, and more importantly, how they are related to the 
. incarnation, are never discussed. This does not defeat 
Erickson's model, but does suggest areas which are in need 
of further exploration. 
The problem with locating the nexus of Christ's 
omniscience in the subconscious of Jesus centers around the 
fact that we do not have a clear understanding yet of how 
the subconscious works and what it involves. Furthermore, 
it is highly questionable that a human subconscious, 
especially if it is located in a human brain, could in any 
sense contain or house an infinite amount of information. 
We could also question Erickson's statement concerning 
omnipotence that Christ probably did not know he possessed 
this attribute for most of his life. 
he claims it is undoubtable that 
In the same context, 
he engaged in the 
activities and games of a normal boy. Likewise, it is even 
more certain that he had thorough training in the Hebrew 
Scriptures. If Jesus had an awareness that he was God, he 
certainly did not fail to realize that he possessed the 
capabilities attributed to him in the Old Testament, and 
omnipotence, or at the very least near omnipotence (if the 
term means anything), is definitely one of those 
characteristics. Does it make any sense to say that Jesus 
knew he possessed this attribute, yet was incapable of 
exercising it at any time, as Erickson seems to indicate? 
r 
This would appear to be an important question. 
sense, then, is Christ omnipotent. 
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In what 
We should further note that Erickson in his discussion 
on the temptation seems to imply a distinct conflict between 
the human and divine wills. Could the one person Jesus have 
willed something in accordance with his human will yet 
contrary to his divine? If there was any such conflict, 
would not the divine will override the human? 
Finally, Erickson's answer to Christ's death appears 
significantly unbiblical. It appears on this view that 
nothing every really dies. This does not seem to accord 
well with the Scriptures in general which affirms that the 
penalty for man's sin is death, physical as well as 
spiritual. More to the issue, Christ himself did not truly 
die. What then becomes of his atoning sacrifice? What 
sense can be made of his resurrection and his victory over 
death? Again, these seem to be serious questions Erickson 
leaves unansered. 
Thomas V. Morris 
The Incoherency Charge 
Apparently the charge has been repeated so often and 
with such authority that few see the need to actually spell 
out what it actually is in the doctrine of incarnation which 
falls prey to these accusations, and it is difficult to find 
any extended argument demonstrating the incoherency of 
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divine incarnation. Because of this lack of real 
_substantive argumentation, Morris attempts to provide it for 
the critics himself. The thought that seems to lie behind 
most of these extreme criticisms is not only the necessary 
falsehood of the incarnation claim but also a belief that 
this claim is .a priori false. That is, no person could 
possibly "both understand it and at the same time be in the 
state of either believing it or even wondering whether it is 
true" (1986, p. 22). 
Every category or kind has a certain set of 
characteristics an individual needs to be placed within that 
kind. These are kind-essential characteristics. Wi thout 
these characteristics, an object is excluded from membership 
it that particular kind. There is a certain set of 
properties traditionally thought to be essential 
characteristics of divinity. That is, no individual could 
be divine without possessing the full range of these 
properties. These properties are normally conceived of as 
including omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, 
eternali ty, immutability, and necessity. Since it is 
essential to emulate this set of properties to be God, and 
becuase it is essential to emulate the logical complements 
of these properties to be human, it is incoherent that Jesus 
could be both fully (truly) God and fully (truly) human. 
The Logic of God Incarnate 
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The most comprehensive defense of the two-nature 
Chalcedonian model in recent years comes from Thomas V. 
Morris in his book The Logic of God Incarnate (1986). In 
this exhaustive treatment, he presents a formidable line of 
argumentation, attempting to justify the orthodox 
interpretation. 
The indiscernibility principle. In relation to he 
incarnation, Morris tries to retain the validity of the 
indiscernibility principle as it governs identity 
statements. The indiscernibility principle states that "a 
necessary condition for identity is complete commonality of 
properties. Further, if it is impossible that some 
object a share all properties in common with some object h, 
it is impossible that a be identical with 12" (1986, p. 17). 
The claim made by orthodoxy that Jesus is God the Son is an 
identity statement and therefore falls under the principle 
of indiscernibility. Taken up front on face value, this 
certainly appears to be an insurmountable problem, given the 
categories God and man are traditionally conceived. But 
Morris makes some very important distinctions which he hopes 
will pave the way for a coherent christology. 
Crucial distinctions. Morris' first distinction 
involves what it means to have kind-essential and what it 
means to have kind-common properties. A common property is 
a property all members of a kind simply happen to have, but 
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do not need in order to be included in membership of that 
kind. A kind-essential property, on the other hand, is a 
property an individual must have in order to be included in 
membership of that kind. For instance, living on the planet 
earth is a kindcommon property of all humans. However, it 
would be conceivable for an individual to live on Mars and 
still be human. This is not the case for kind-essential 
properties. 
is defined) 
human beings. 
Possessing a human nature (however that nature 
is essential for inclusion in the class of 
Any individual without a human nature cannot 
be so classified. 
Having made this important distinction, Morris claims 
that the Christian theologian is perfectly justified in 
spelling out what it means to be human, and what essential 
properties are necessary for inclusion as a human, with the 
doctrine of the incarnation already in mind. Morris writes 
But it is a perfectly proper procedure (some would even 
say - rightly, I think - mandatory) for the Christian 
philosopher or theologian to develop his idea of human 
nature, his conception of what the essential human 
properties are, with certain presuppositions or 
controls derived from his doctrine of God and his 
belief in the reali ty of the Incarnation (1986, p. 
64) • 
Incarnation 
26 
Therefore all properties of humanity which are logical 
. complements of essentail properties of di vini ty, such as 
contingency, temporality, et. al., are said to be common 
properties of humanity, not essential. This distinction 
allows Morris ascribe to Jesus the full range of essential 
human properties without concluding that Jesus exemplified 
both a attribute and its logical complement. 
This lead us to the second distinction. Morris 
differentiates between what it means to be merely human and 
what it means to be fully human. It is this latter 
category, that of being fully human, to which, Morris is 
quick to point out, Jesus belongs according to the 
Chalcedonian formulation. He writes, "An individual is 
merely human just in case it has all the properties 
requisite 
limitation 
limitations 
humanity. 
for being 
properties 
are not 
fully human. and also some 
as well" (1986, p. 65). These 
essential but common properties of 
In order to make this more clear, Morris utilizes the 
following illustration. A diamond, an alligator, and a 
human are all physical. The diamond has all the properties 
essential to being a physical object (mass, spatiotemporal 
location, etc. ) This diamond is fully physical. The 
alligator is fully physical as well, but it is not merely 
physical. It is also animate. The human is both fully 
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physical and fully animate as well. Yet it is not merely 
animate, for it possess the capacity for rational thought, 
creati vi ty, and aesthetics. The human then "belongs to a 
higher ontological level by virtue of being human. And if. 
. he belongs to no ontological level higher than that of 
humanity, he is merely human as well as being fully human" 
(1986, p. 66). 
In making these distinction, Morris has come a long way 
in rebutting the incoherence charge. The logical 
impossibilities seem to be clearing up: 
Properties as those of possibly coming into existence, 
coming to be at some time, being a contingent creation, 
and being such as to possibly cease to exist are, 
although common human properties, not essential to 
being human. They, or some of them, may be essential 
to being merely human, but they can be held, in all 
epistemic and metaphysical propriety, not to be 
essential to being fully human, to exemplifying the 
kind-essence of humanity (1986, p. 67). 
We can say then that Jesus was fully human, becuase he 
possessed all the attributes required for inclusion in the 
category of humanity and because he also belonged to a 
higher ontological level. Human beings simpliciter belong 
in the classification of being merely human, as the diamond 
is merely physical without being animate. Thus it is 
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possible for an individual to exemplify all the essential 
attributes of both divinity and humanity without 
exemplifying any properties and their logical compliments. 
However, there is yet much work to be done. In 
Morris' own words, these distinctions can imply an "utterly 
fantastic figure of Christ" (1986, p. 70). We are left at 
this point with a Christ who was eternal, omnipotent, 
omniscient, incorporeal, immutable, and impassible (p. 73). 
Clearly this is not only undesirable but grossly 
missaligned with the biblical record. 
A two-minded Christ. Morris spends some time arguing 
that the Anselmian conception of divinity is the same God as 
the Yahweh of Judeo-Christian theology. This is important 
for him because he wants to maintain the possibility of an 
exalted concept of deity such as the Anselmian can still be 
reconciled with the notion of incarnation. 
The Anselmian conception of God is that of a greatest 
possible, or maximally perfect, being. On this 
conception, God is thought of as exemplifying 
necessarily a maximally perfect set of compossible 
great-making properties. Tradi tionally, the 
Anselmian description has been understood to entail 
that God is, among other things, omnipotent, immutable, 
eternal, and impeccable as well as omniscient (1986, p. 
76) • 
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Morris goes on to argue that this a priori notion of God can 
be reconciled with the empirical data of the biblical 
record. What is more important for our purposes is how 
Morris explicates the relation of Jesus to these attributes. 
Morris calls his own incarnational christology a two-
minds view. In the person of Christ there co-inhabited two 
distinct ranges of consciousness. 
There is first what we can call the eternal mind of 
God the Son with its distinctively divine cons-
ciousness, whatever that might be like, encompassing 
the full scope of omniscience. And in addition there 
is a distinctly earthly consciousness that came into 
existence and grew and developed as the boy Jesus grew 
and developed. The earthly range of consciousness, 
and self-consciousness, was thoroughly human, Jewish, 
and first century Palestinian in nature (1986, p. 103). 
The divine Logos encompassed the human mind. It had 
complete and immediate access to everything therein. By 
contrast, the human mind only had only that access into the 
divine permitted it by the Logos. 
Morris sees this view as a large gain over kenoticism, 
for it is "not by virtue of what he gave up, but in virtue 
of what he took on, that [Christ] humbled himself" (1986, p. 
104) . God the Son did not divest himself of any 
metaphysical properties; he took on all of our sufferings, 
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trials, and frustrations an exclusively divine existence 
would be immune from. 
The tempation of Jesus. Morris engages in a lengthy 
discussion of God r s goodness and defends its necessity on 
intuitive grounds. He is cautious here, for Morris is 
hesitant to make the appeal to intuition. However, he says, 
"Against this backdrop of general doubt about the status of 
many metaphysical intuitions, however, I believe the 
Anselmian theist to be justified in marking out at least a 
few intuitions about metaphysical matters as trustworthy" 
(1986, p. 134). Among these is the necessi ty of God's 
goodness. Morris argues that this can be inferred from the 
general Anselmian intuitions concerning the nature of God. 
What relevance this has for our discussion of the 
divine incarnation is not readily apparent at first, but 
becomes very clear with respect to the temptation of Christ. 
The clear biblical account pictures a Christ to suffered 
under real temptation, and this is crucial for our 
soteriology. If Christ is God the Son, and God the Son is 
God, and God the is necessarily good, it is inconceivable 
that Christ could have sinned, and therefore he could not 
have been tempted in any real way. Theists have even been 
accused of holding contradictory beliefs concerning the 
modal status of God's goodness and the possibility of 
Jesus' temptation in any substantive sense of the idea. 
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Morris makes another distinction, and it is here that, 
in this author's opinion, Morris' presentation of the two-
nature view sounds most convincing, for not only does it 
present a feasible and coherent model of the incarnation, 
but it also goes a long way in clearing up a debate in 
Christendom as long standing as the sovereignty/free-will 
issue. The logical or metaphysical possibility of sinning 
is not required for actual temptation, but only the 
epistemic possibility (1986, p. 147). If Jones is tempted 
to lie to his boss, that temptation is in every sense real, 
regardless of the fact that, unbeknownst to Jones, his boss 
died an hour earlier. 
Jesus could be tempted to sin just in case it was 
epistemically possible for him that he sin. If at the 
times of his reported temptations, the full accessible 
belief-set of his earthly mind did not rule out the 
possibility of his sinning, he could be genuinely 
tempted, in that range of consciousness, to sin (p. 
148) . 
Yet it is still not feasible how it could be the case that 
Jesus had the epistemic possbility to sin without the 
metaphysical possibility. 
Here is where Morris employs his two-minds model. The 
human range of consciousness only apprehended of his divine 
nature that which the eternal mind of the Logos permitted. 
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There were obviously at least a few things about which 
Christ was ignorant. If the human mind was not aware that 
he was necessarily good, that is, if this item of 
information was withheld by the Logos, then temptation 
occurred every bit as real as our own. 
Morris completes his discussion by arguing that a two-
minds view does not necessarily lead into a two-person form 
of heresy such as Nestorianism. He argues that although 
Jesus Christ had two distinct ranges of consciousness, there 
exists only one "center of causal and cogni ti ve powers" 
(1986, p. 162). Thus only one person, yet with two distinct 
minds, is present in the person of Christ. 
It is by this dual employment of fine but important 
distinctions and a two-minds view of the person of Christ 
that Morris hopes to role back the serious charge of logical 
impossibility leveled at the orthodox interpretation of 
incarnation. It is most impressive, and one critic even 
goes so far as to call it "brilliant and sophisticated" 
(Durrant, 1988, p. 127). Now the emphasis will shift from 
mere presentation to an analysis and critique. 
Assessing and Critiquing Morris 
Does Morris accomplish his rather lofty task? We will 
turn to some criticisms offered by his fellow philosophers 
and assess the value of these attempted rebuttals. The most 
notable discussions corne from Michael Durrant and John Hick, 
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each making their own contributions. Finally, we will 
close both this section and this paper with an evaluation my 
this author. 
Michael Durrant's qualitative distinctions. Durrant's 
objection to Morris centers around the second distinction he 
makes, that of being merely human as opposed to being fully 
human. Durrant argues that Morris makes an illicit 
conflagration of "not being fully physical" and "being 
merely physical" as each is distinguished "being fully 
physical" (1988, p. 124). Not fully physical/fully physical 
is a quantitative distinction indicating whether or not the 
object has all the properties essential to being physical. 
However, fully physical/merely physical is a quali tati ve 
distinction dealing with the ontological status of the 
obj ect. This illicit conflagration is carried over into 
Morris' crucial fully human/merely human distinction. 
John Hick's Disputed Questions. Hick's attempted 
refutation is much more thorough than Durrant's, and 
approaches Morris' demonstration at several points. Hick's 
first question is whether Morris' idea of ontological 
progression really allows for higher level beings to become 
incarnate in lower ones (1993, pp. 61-62). Could, using 
the examples of Morris, a human soul become incarnate in a 
crocodile. Hick objects: 
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Of course, given the existing laws of nature such a 
thing is empirically, or causally, impossible. It 
would require the crocodile to have a brain of the size 
and complexity found only at the human level of 
evolution. . . And in the case of an incarnation of God 
as a human being there would be analogous contrary-to-
natural-law difficulties. How could a finite human 
brain receive, process and retain the infinitely 
extensive information possessed by omniscience? How 
could a finite human physique be able to exert infinite 
power? (p. 62). 
It should be noted that both these questions but especially 
the first can be easily settled by an appeal to Morris' two-
mind model. To be sure, Hick has not arrived at that point 
yet, but when he does, he does not do Morris the courtesy of 
pointing out the fact that he provides these answers and 
merely lets the objection stand. Further, Morris is not as 
yet dealing with the incarnation proper; the purpose of the 
ontological progression is the establishment of the fully 
x/merely x distinction. 
Hick goes on to say that "the incarnation of a higher 
kind as a lower kind would inevitably break the ordinary 
mould of the lower kind" (1993, p. 64). A man emulating in 
him the essential characteristics of di vini ty would 
certainly be recognized as something far greater than being 
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merely human. And, unfortunately, nobody contemporary with 
Jesus, not even his disciples, considered him to be any more 
than just that. To support this incredible claim, Hick 
quotes one of his favorite Bible verses, Acts 2:22: Jesus 
of Nazareth was a man approved by God who did by him many 
wonders and miracles. Clearly a man incarnated in Morris' 
sense would have been a "walking miracle; and the historical 
evidence indicates that Jesus was not this" (p. 65). 
What Hick is apparently trying to do up to this point 
is not discredit Morris' incarnational model, but 
demonstrate the difficulties he must overcome in arguing how 
the divine and human attributes could be composite (1993, p. 
66) . In the second phase of his essay, Hick attempts to 
bear down even harder in his critique. 
First, he suggests that the discussion given by Morris 
concerning the way in which the two minds access one another 
does not receive adequate attention. "The nature of the 
limi ted access of the human to the divine mind postulated 
here needs to be specified more fully. I can see two rather 
different ways of spelling it out" (1993, p. 70). The first 
explanation sees Jesus as having become enlightened to the 
surrounding awareness of another consciousness, God the Son; 
an I-Thou sort of consciousness. This accords rather well 
wi th the Synoptic gospel record, Hick admits, except that 
"the encompassing divine presence of which he was so vividly 
T 
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aware was not the second person of a Trinity but simply God, 
known as Abba, father" (p. 70). What we have then, 
especially when we consider the fact that Jesus' 
relationship with the father involved a volitional aspect in 
addition to a mere cognitive, is a figure who was inspired 
by God. That is, Jesus, along with Moses, Jeremiah, 
Muhammad, and a host of others in history, "is 
overwhelmingly conscious of God's presence, speaks to God, 
hears God's voice ... is aware of God's will" (p. 70) and 
so on. Thus we have a Jesus separated from us by mere 
degree. Clearly this is not what Morris intends. 
The second way the two minds might be related, Hick 
proposes, involves not interaction between the human and 
divine but unity with the divine (1993, p. 71). This view, 
in contrast with the previous, is, according to Hick, 
consonant with the fourth gospel. However, at the root, it 
is subj ect to the same criticism. Jesus in John's gospel 
believes his unity was with the Father God, not God the Son, 
second person of the Trinity. Furthermore, Hick asserts 
that such an individual as pictured in the forth gospel 
could not possibly share in our human condition, even if he 
is counted as "fully human" (p. 71). 
Some of the difficulty of disputing with Hick at this 
point rests in the fact that his above conclusions rest on 
the challengable grounds of histoircal criticism and Hick's 
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own "inspirational christology." To take him to task on 
either of these issues would be far beyond the scope of this 
paper. Up front, we would have to grant Hick that no fully 
developed concept of the Trinity appears in the gospels, or 
for that matter, in all of the Bible, at least not to the 
extent reflected at Nicea. However, it is true further that 
three distinct entities are spoken of as though each one 
were deity, and from this, as well as an orthodox belief in 
the inspiration of Scriptures, that we construct the 
doctrine of the Trinity, and from this doctrine we identify 
Jesus with God the Son. Further defense and analysis 
cannot be done here. 
As for Hick's inspirational christology, we can only 
point to the fact that this view accords very poorly with 
the actual New Testament record and does not take into 
account much of the significance of Jesus' activity, such as 
forgiving sins. Nor does it adequately explain the attitude 
of his own disciples toward him. While Hick's own 
christology may answer many questions on the surface, his 
own complete argument for it (presented in chapter 3 of 
Disputed Questions) rests on the assertion that neither did 
Jesus nor any of his disciples claim he was divine in the 
sense claimed by the subsequent doctrine of the church. 
Such a claim may be challenged on several grounds, but it is 
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enough here to note that such a view must be rej ected by 
anyone wishing to remain faithful to orthodoxy. 
Hick's next objection focuses on the two wills of 
Christ, especially as it relates to the temptation. Morris 
argues for an "asynunetric accessing relation between the two 
minds." Hick is emphatic that this is not enough in itself, 
but Morris supplies an additional relation, a unity "of 
personal cognitive and causal powers" (Morris, 1986, pp. 
161-162). However, in order to avoid monotheletism, Morris 
affirms a human will for Christ. It cannot be the case that 
whatever Jesus willed was what God the Son willed. Morris' 
position, in Hick's words, is that "Jesus was humanly free, 
including being free to sin, but that if he had in fact 
tried to sin the divine will would have intervened to stop 
him" (1993, p. 74). Hick merely responds by saying that 
this proposal fails when we realize that it entails 
that we do not, and cannot, know whether Jesus ever 
had the beginning of an intention to sin that activated 
a divine overruling that prevented him from proceeding 
(p. 75). 
Hick means that we cannot know how far Christ's human mind 
ever went in succumbing to temptation empirically, as he 
makes clear with the phrase immediately following the above 
quote, "So far as human observation can tell. . " However, 
even granting that Morris' model is empirically unverifiable 
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at this point, how does that render it false? The entire 
idea of an incarnation cannot be determined by historical 
verification so important to Hick. Hick could of clarified 
his position in the first paragraph of his essay by stating, 
"This proposal [that God became incarnate in man] fails when 
we realize that it cannot be known by human observation at 
all. So far as human observation can tell, he was only 
another Jew living in Palestine during the first century." 
Hick further argues that, given Morris' framework, even 
assuming the traditional claim that Christ never could have 
performed a sinful action, we still cannot know "whether 
this was so because he never even began to intend a sinful 
act, or because he did so intend (perhaps many times) but 
the intention was always overruled by his divine nature" 
(1993, p. 75). However, any traditional concept of sin is 
not at all limited to acts. Bad motives and intents are 
consistently categorized as sin in both the biblical record 
and Christian thought ever since. Hick would have realized 
had he read more closely, that Morris realizes this. 
Decisions (intents) as well as deeds are equally considered 
to be sin (Morris, p. 152). 
Hick's concluding objection seems to possesses a degree 
of potency. He suggests that Morris' presentation gives us a 
Jesus with both a human will and a human mind of his own. 
He is God incarnate 
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. .not in the sense that the personal will that was 
encountered by all who met Jesus was the will of God 
the Son operation on earth, but in the sense that God 
singled him out for special treatment - namely by not 
allowing him to go wrong. It follows that if God, in 
addition to being omnisciently aware of the contents of 
someone else's mind, were also to prevent her from 
making any wrong choices, that person would be another 
instance of God (1993, pp. 75 - 76). 
Hick is apparently accusing Morris' construction of reducing 
the humanity of Jesus to a state no different from any other 
human. It will do no good to respond by pointing out that 
Christ possess in addition to his human will and human mind 
the full array of kind-essential properties for di vini ty, 
for according to Morris all these properties have been 
predicated soley to the divine mind. It is Hick's point 
that in doing so, on Morris' framework, the incarnation was 
merely an instance of God preserving an ordinary human from 
sinning. And now, he asks, "has not the heart of the 
Chalcedonian conception been missed out . . ?" (p. 76). 
In spite of this final objection, it appears that 
Hick's evaluation and dismissal of Morris' model does not do 
it full justice. Hick has been claiming for years that any 
attempt to give literal content to the idea of the 
incarnation is bound to result in heresy. He repeats that 
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same claim in the introduction to this essay and in fact 
posi ts as his thesis how Morris' effort is merely another 
example of that claim (1993, p. 58). While we all have our 
own agendas and axes to grind, it would appear that Hick's 
presuppositions have led him to give Morris' argument less 
credibility than it deserves. 
Two final criticisms. It must be admitted by any 
reviewer that Morris certainly has presented a formidable 
case. He is a very careful thinker and is especially 
sensitive in advance to any objections and shortcomings his 
presentation might be subject to. However, Durrant's well-
argued criticism could prove fatal to his model. In 
addition, this author would like to submit two final 
concerns. 
The first involves Morris' habit of disregarding 
accepted metaphysical principles ~ facto which would 
topple his model. The first of these arises in his reply to 
Leigh (cf. below). Morris has proposed that Christ 
possesses only one individual nature, yet two kind natures. 
The danger lies in the fact that many philosophers maintain 
that a necessary component of an object's individual nature 
is its kind nature. However, Christian theists, Morris 
among them, have traditionally wanted to affirm that Christ 
possessed the kind nature of humanity, but he possessed it 
only contingently, not necessarily. Therefore Morris 
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denies the metaphysical principle that a kind nature is a 
necessary component of an object's individual nature; Christ 
did not possess his human kind-nature essentially. Before we 
move on to the next example, we should note that Morris 
denies this same type of move to Leigh, as will be seen in 
our next discussion (Natures, 1984, pp. 42 - 43). 
A further example involves the origins of biological 
kinds Most philosophers hold that a certain type of origin 
is essential in the inclusion of a certain type or kind. If 
all members of kind A have a certain origin B, then B is an 
essential characteristic for inclusion in A. This could 
present a real difficulty in the case of the virgin birth. 
If the principle holds, then Christ obviously could not have 
become incarnate. Morris evades the issue by merely denying 
this principle on the basis of creation ~ nihilo (1986, p. 
68) . Adam and his descendants are of the same kind, yet 
they certainly do not have similar origins. 
Morris believes that he or any theologian is 
"completely justified in employing his core theological 
convictions as a check and constraint on his metaphysical 
theorizing" (Natures, 1984, p. 42). However, it appears 
that these maneuvers have little more legitimacy than the 
move many theologians are ready to make, much to the outrage 
of the philosophers, into the arena of mystery. John Hick, 
in one of his more sensible critiques, pointed out that, "It 
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is possible to make such rulings; although of course they 
are arbitrary and such that other are under no obligation to 
accept them" (1993, p. 63). 
The second criticism this writer holds towards 
Morris although this could probably be better phrased a 
reservation than a criticism - concerns the resutant Christ 
we encounter in the two-minds view? Is Christ a 
schizophrenic? Morris even uses the analogy of 
schizophrenia to illustrate his model. How did a Jesus on 
earth with both a human nature and a human mind walk on the 
water, or feed 5,000 people with five loaves and two fish. 
Was this the work of the divine mind or the human? Can the 
two minds be so distinguished and yet inseparable, that we 
can say which act was performed by the human Jesus, and 
which act by the divine Christ? These appear to be 
legitimate questions which Morris leaves unaddressed. Until 
a feasible reply is given, a complete acceptance of his 
incarnational formula, while innovative and brilliant, would 
not be wise. 
Reformulation: Ronald Leigh 
The second appraoch taken to defend the idea of a 
divine incarnation differs from the previous ones discussed 
so far in a very important respect. The theologians and 
philosophers so far examined have all sought to defend the 
integrity of the formulation of the incarnation as laid down 
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in the Council of Chalcedon. Ronald Leigh on the other hand 
joins with the critics in rejecting such a view as 
incoherent. However, unlike most of these critics, he is 
very much concerned to remain faithful to the biblical 
record attesting to Jesus I full humanity and full deity. 
Leigh hopes to show that a one-natured God-man model not 
only stands on the firm ground of logical consistency but 
does justice to the text of Scriptures. 
Leigh begins by pointing out the fact that no 
indi vidual can have more than one nature. He defines 
"nature" as "the set of essential characteristics (qualities 
or attributes) of any given individual or class of 
individuals" (1982, p. 125) . Whatever essential 
characteristics any given thing has, then, is its nature. 
Quite obviously, then, and individual cannot have two 
natures. He writes 
Suppose that nearly all individuals have been 
classified according to their characteristics. 
unique individual is found whose one 
Then a 
set of 
characteristics includes characteristics from two 
previously established classifications. Even in such a 
case it would not be appropriate to say that that 
unique individual has two natures (p. 125). 
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Rather such a unique individual would still have only one 
nature, and that nature includes characteristics also 
included in other natures. 
According to Leigh, the problem arises when attempting 
to describe the individual in question as having mutually 
exclusive attributes. When this occurs, we ought to 
cri tically examine the accuracy of the description. For 
Leigh, the move to antinomy offers no solution at all, but 
merely an unwanted and unwarranted evasion which is both 
contrary to evangelical apologetics and biblical data. We 
ought therefore to interpret the ontological status of Jesus 
as having one nature, a nature which includes both all the 
attributes essential to humanity and all the attributes 
essential to deity (1983, p. 56). As an analogy, Leigh 
suggests that of a chair-desk. A chair-desk has all the 
properties essential to being a chair, and all the 
properties essential to being a desk. 
[E]ven though the chair desk has only one nature, it is 
truly a chair and at the same time is truly a desk. 
Furthermore, the chair desk is properly included in the 
classification "chairs" even though it is not exactly 
identical to all other chairs, and is properly included 
in the classification "desks" even though it is not 
exactly identical to all other desks. (1982, p. 132) 
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Leigh is careful to ennuciate that although, in both the 
case of Christ and the chair desk, a third classification is 
formed, this is one of inclusion, not exclusion. In other 
words, the third classification is not a genuine tertium 
~ because it qualifies for both previously established 
classifications (p. 132). 
The incarnation is possible because of a real 
similari ty existing between God and man, reflected in the 
doctrine of the image of God. "Many theologians treat the 
set of human characteristics and the set of divine 
characteristics as disjoint sets [cf. Norman Geisler above] 
when they are really overlapping sets" (1983, p. 56). There 
are real differences between Christ and the Father and 
between Christ and fallen man, but these are all non-
essential differences. There is also a real similarity 
between all three, namely the image of God, or the personal 
aspect of our natures. Leigh contends that the doctrine of 
the image of God has been missing far too much from most 
christological discussion. Leigh describes the person as 
the "non-material, self-conscious, rational, emotive, and 
volitional soul or spirit of man" (1982, p. 133). This 
aspect of our beings we have in common with the Father and 
also Christ. 
Yet it is here that the most obvious weakness of 
Leigh I s model is apparent. He is forced to concede that 
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certain attributes traditionally thought to belong to Christ 
in at least some sense do not, for instance omniscience and 
omnipotence. The problem is that many theologians have 
wanted to claim that not only are these properties of God, 
but they are necessary properties, that is, any individual 
without them would not classify for divinity. Leigh 
suggests that Jesus is nearly omniscient and nearly 
omnipotent, but does not seem too certain, for in both 
articles he attributes these to Jesus with a question mark 
after each one. Apparently he is not quite sure what to do 
with these attributes. 
However, this is not necessarily a serious obj ection 
in itself for two reasons. First, it points out an area in 
Leigh's model that needs work, not that defeats it. Second, 
while claiming that qualities such as necessary omnipotence 
and necessary omniscience are not essential to divinity may 
be a problem for some theologians and philosophers, it is 
not for Leigh. He claims that such attributes come from 
importing a priori concepts into the nature of man and 
divinity without first consulting the biblical record. He 
claims that to accurately describe the characteristics of 
Jesus "we must base our description on the explicit New 
Testament statements of the characteristics of Jesus rather 
than on the assumed content of the concept 'God'" (1982, p. 
136) . 
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But there are other more threatening objections that 
can be brought against Leigh's presentation. In the first 
place, his criticism is invalid that an individual cannot 
have more than one nature on the grounds that it fails to 
distinguish between a kind-nature and an individual-nature. 
Thomas Morris points out that, "No individual has more that 
one individualnature. But of course it does not follow from 
this that no individual has more that one kind-nature" 
(1986, p. 40). 
Morris does admit that individual-natures are 
exemplified essentially. However, he denies on 
Christological grounds the claim that kind-natures are an 
essential sub-set of individual-natures and replaces it with 
the claim that only typical members of a kind (in the sense 
of common or average) must posses a kind-nature as an 
essential aspect of their individual-nature. Morris does 
hold that least one kind-nature is essential to an 
indi vidual. Therefore any individual with more than one 
kind-nature must possess only one kind-nature essentially; 
the other he may posses contingently (1984, p. 44). 
On Leigh's view, Christ is a typical member of the 
class Incarnality, and he therefore must possess his kind-
nature essentially. Yet Christ's human attributes he 
possess only contingently. In short, Christ must possess as 
part of his essential nature characteristics he has only 
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contingently (Morris, 1984, p. 42). And of course this 
leads to the kind of contradiction Leigh wants to avoid. He 
responds by denying that the notion of a typical member has 
any real meaning, and therefore Morris has manufactured this 
objection (1984, p. 45). However, denial does not appear to 
have any real substance other than the fact that it defeats 
Leigh's own view. 
A further objection to Leigh rests on Trinitarian 
grounds. He denies the property of omniscience, and 
possibly others as well, to not only Christ but also the 
Holy Spirit (1982, p. 136, n. 31). This make a radical 
difference between the various members of the Trinity. 
Millard J. Erickson points out 
As 
Now, to be sure, there are some 
distinguish the three members of 
differences which 
the Trinity as 
separate persons. Usually, however, these differences 
are seen as involving function rather than power. 
it is highly questionable whether, given such an 
understanding of the Trinity, we could say that the 
three are of the same essence (1991, p. 538). 
Having already rejected a major creed of Christendom in its 
claims of Christ, Leigh may be willing to go further and 
deny the traditional formulation of the Trinity as three 
persons with one divine essence. This deviation ought to 
sound a clear warning to evangelicals. The further he 
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strays from historical orthodoxy, the more cautious we ought 
to be in following him without explicit Scriptual grounding. 
Praradox: Soren Kierkegaard 
We now turn to our final model of the incarnation. The 
Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard, who made massive 
contributions to the philosophy of religion as well as other 
areas, offers numerous relevant insights into the Christian 
dogma under question. In the following discussion we will 
find that Kierkegaard' s answer to the problem is far more 
adequate than those presented already. 
The Absolute Paradox 
Among the many distincti ves throughout Kierkegaard' s 
thought, one of the most unique is his response to the 
problem of the God-man. While the other thinkers we have 
been considering have been busy attempting to resolve the 
tension of the Chalcedon formula, Kierkegaard embraces it. 
While Morris, Geisler, et. al., try to untangle the complex 
theological and philosophical implications of "very God of 
very God" and the rest of the creed so that in the end we 
have no irrevocable objections, Kierkegaard merely affirms 
the reality of the knot and goes no further in that 
direction. 
Yet Kierkegaard does much more than just acknowledge 
the problem of the incarnation. He places it - not just 
God incarnate but the problem of God incarnate - at the very 
center of the Christian faith. 
Paradox." He writes 
What, then, is the absurd? 
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It is the "Absolute 
The absurd is that the 
eternal truth has come into existence in time, that God 
has come into existence, has been born, has grown up, 
etc., has come into existence exactly as an individual 
human being (1992, p. 210). 
This may seem straightforward enough, but Kierkegaard had a 
way of forging new categories and meanings. It is important 
to read him carefully in order to understand exactly what he 
meant when he spoke of the Absolute Paradox. 
It is the paraoxical drive of reason, as with all 
passions, to will its own annihilation (Kierkegaard, 1985, 
pp. 38-39). One commentator wrote, "All the strivings of 
dialectic are designed to reach a conclusion wherein such 
striving shall no longer be necessary" (Croxall, 1948, pp. 
118-119). The ideal end of reason is to "get to the bottom 
of things, at which point there will no longer be any need 
for further understanding. However, reason in its passion 
eventually arrives at a dimension into which it cannot 
penetrate, and therefore its goal of self-destruction can 
never be realized. "This, then, is the ultimate paradox of 
thought: to want to discover something that thought itself 
cannot think" (Kierkegaard, 1985, p. 37). This unknown area 
into which the reason cannot probe Kierkegaard calls ~ gQd 
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(p. 39). In equating the god with the realm of the unknown, 
he affirms its complete transcendence. Kierkegaard recoiled 
against the immanent God of Hegel, who claimed the mind of 
God is the mind of man and vise versa. All of history is 
the unfolding of the mind of god, according to Hegel. 
However, for Keirkegaard, the chasm between the unknown and 
the understanding is so absolute - the "absolute difference" 
- that even to label it as such does not get us very far, 
for reason cannot absolutely negate itself and arrive at an 
understanding of what lies in the unknown (p. 45). 
Understanding, in trying to grasp the difference, confuses 
it with itself. Therefore it cannot know either the 
difference or the god through its own dialectical passion. 
At this point we seem to stand at a paradox. Just to 
come to know that the god is the different, man needs 
the god and then comes to know that the god is 
absolutely different from him. But if the god is to be 
absolutely different from a human being, this can have 
its basis not in that which man owes to the god. 
but ... in that which he himself has committed. What, 
then, is the difference? Indeed, what else but sin (p. 
47) • 
This sin absolutely separates the human from the god, and 
this separation can only be learned if the god teaches it 
himself. What should move the god to do this? Certainly 
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not need, but then what else if not sheer love (p. 24)? And 
yet there is unbearable sorrow in this, the sort of sorrow 
that is "the result not of the lovers' being unable to have 
each other but of their being able to understand each other" 
(p. 25). How can there be a true reciprocal relation of 
communication and understanding between the god and man 
when they are so quanti tati vely different? The god must 
appear not only as teacher, then, but also in equality. 
Thus the paradox becomes even more terrible, or the 
same paradox has the duplexi ty by which it manifests 
itself as the absolute - negatively, by bringing into 
prominence the absolute difference of sin and, 
positively, by wanting to annul this absolute 
difference in the absolute equality (p. 47). 
At this point it is obvious where Kierkegaard wants to go 
with his thought project, or re-construction of 
Christianity. 
equality that 
The god appears to us as teacher in absolute 
he may abolish the absolute difference. 
In what manner or form does the god appear to us? How 
can the absolutely different communicate? Is it possible 
for the qualitative, infinite difference between the god and 
man to be bridged? Kierkegaard replies that the god appears 
among us incognito, "an incognito impenetrable to the most 
intimate observation" (1946, p. 388). God could not 
communicate himself directly, but only indirectly. Wi th 
T 
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wi tticism only possible for Kierkegaard, he says, "Look, 
there he stands - the god. Where? There. Can you not see 
him? He is the god, and yet he has no place where he can 
lay his head ... " (1985, p. 32). The implications of this 
will become apparent in the next section. What is important 
here is Kierkegaard's claim that direct communication from 
the god is nonexistent if not impossible. 
Indirect communication is important because the goal of 
the god is to teach Truth. By this, Kierkegaard means 
subjective truth, that is a passionate response of the will 
as opposed to objective, abstract truth, which involves only 
the intellect. "An objective uncertainty, held fast through 
appropriation with the most passionate inwardness, is the 
truth, the highest truth there is for an existing person" 
(1992, p. 203, emphasis his). 
Faith in the God-man 
Another factor in Kierkegaard which distinguishes him 
from our other authors is his intense concern for the 
existing individual. The entire thought-proj ect of 
Fragments centers around the eternal happiness of the 
individual. The questions of faith in the Absolute Paradox 
is crucially bound up in the question of the Paradox itself. 
It is in this discussion that Kierkegaard' s view of the 
relation of history to both faith and the incarnation will 
surface. 
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Because in Christ God appeared incognito, it is 
impossible to historically discern the identity of the two. 
To the question, "Can one learn from history anything about 
Christ?" Kierkegaard answers with an uncharacteristically 
direct, "No" (1946, p. 388). To the related question, "Can 
one prove from history that Christ was God?" the response 
is equally unequivocal and equally negative (p. 389). It is 
impossible 
it is as 
to prove a contradiction, all the more so when 
foolish a contradiction as the idea that "a 
definite individual man is God" (p. 389). 
If the divinity of Christ cannot be demonstrated, how 
can it be known? Simply by faith. And when we see what 
Kierkegaard means by faith, we will understand why he so 
easily dismissed historical evidence. 
What human beings need is the Truth, according to 
Kierkegaard, and this Truth is not to be found in the 
teaching of Christ, but in Christ himself. However, not 
only do we need the Truth, we need also the condition for 
receiving it. To say that we posses this condition takes us 
back to the Socratic/ Hegelian immanence Kierkegaard so 
strongly wanted to do away with. According to Socrates and 
Hegel, (though not in the same sense) the truth is 
something inherent within man. 
On the Hegelian account. . Jesus may have been the 
first person to recognize man's essential oneness with 
1 
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God, but once this truth was recognized, it is 
essentially true of all human beings. Man's divinity 
is being concretely actualized though history. But 
this is an expression of the principle of immanence 
(Evans, 1983, p. 26). 
The teacher provides merely the occasion for recollecting 
that which was intrinsic to the learner all the time. 
However, if we stand in untruth, and the truth is not 
in us, we need to receive both the condition for the Truth 
and the Truth itself. Not only do we need Christ, but we 
need the ability to receive Him. This is a timeless 
encounter with the Transcendent God called the moment. In 
the moment, God grants the condition and the Truth. 
Kierkegaard describes the moment as the point at which 
the "understanding and the paradox happily encounter each 
other in the moment when the understanding steps aside and 
the paradox gives itself, and the third something. . in 
which this occurs ... is that happy passion. We shall 
call it faith" (1985, p. 59). This happy passion is the 
condition for the Truth, for embracing the paradox. 
We see then that faith is a passionate response by the 
individual to God as God confronts him in the moment. As we 
have already said, faith is something given by God to the 
individual, something that occurs eternally in time. Faith 
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is no mere resolution of the will, though that is certainly 
involved, but a work of the divine in the existing human. 
Because this is not a temporal phenomenon, the 
believers of every age receive their faith directly from 
God. This is the foundation of Kierkegaard's doctrine of 
contemporaneousness. Faith is not handed down one generation 
to the next. God gives it directly to believers of all 
ages. The first hand follower of Christ, the disciple who 
actually witnessed the miracles, the teachings, and the 
resurrection, has no advantage over any subsequent follower; 
all must receive the condition from God with whom, because 
he is eternal, they are all contemporaneous. The occasion 
for belief for the contemporary is the immediate 
contemporaneity, the occasion for the later follower is the 
report of the contemporary, but in both cases the believer 
receives the condition from the god (1985, p. 104). 
This idea is extremely important, and crucial to the 
entire idea of being a Christian at all. Robert Bretall 
wrote in the introduction to Training in Christianity, 
"Christianity is: to become contemporary with Christ in His 
suffering and humiliation" (1946, p. 372). This involves 
the possibility of offense, or a negative response, which we 
will discuss in the following section. 
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All of this may seem to have the result of completely 
undermining the historical. So extreme is his position 
that it led Kierkegaard to make the famous claim: 
Even if the contemporary generation had not left 
anything behind except these words, 'We have believed 
that in such and such a year the god appeared in the 
humble form of a servant, lived and taught among us, 
and then died' - this is more than enough (1985, p. 
104) • 
Kierkegaard's extreme emphasis on the non-temporality 
of faith might lead us to wonder why an incarnation at all. 
One critic asked if in the end the incarnation was not 
superfluous altogether. "Since it is not possible to base 
eternal happiness upon historical knowledge anyway I see 
little reason except some unexplained ontological 
supposition at work in Kierkegaard to suppose that such a 
point of departure really must be historical" (Levine, p. 
173) . 
There are two possible responses to this obj ection. 
The first concerns the necessary objectivity of the 
incarnation. Unless we are going to revert back to a 
purely subjective, arbitrary religion, another kind of 
pagan immanence, we need a definite objective intrusion of 
God into history, even if this intrusion can only be known 
by faith. "The objectivity of the historical is required in 
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order to get 'the God outside yourself'" (Evans, 1990, p. 
472). Without the historical incarnation, we would be left 
with a confusion of the absolute difference with our 
understanding, and have no knowledge of the paradox at all. 
"In the realm of fantastical fabrication, paganism has been 
adequately luxuriant" (Kierkegaard, 1985, p. 45). The 
historical record is largely, if not completely, irrelevant 
because the obj ect of faith is Teacher, not the teaching. 
The scrap of paper with more than enough on it to serve as 
the occasion for faith is a testimony not to the teaching, 
but to the Teacher. It is enough because we do not need 
historical information about Christ, but we do need a 
historical incarnation. 
Second, and perhaps more to the issue of eternal 
happiness which Levine addresses, we need to remember that 
for Kierkegaard, salvation is being in Truth, not objective, 
abstract truth, but subjective, existential truth. But in 
order to teach this, the god had to become as we, that he 
might provide the opportunity for both faith and offense, 
thereby, in the former case, producing subjective truth in 
the life of the believer. 
But one cannot have become a Christian without having 
already come to Him in His estate of humiliation -
without having come to Him, who is the sign of offense 
and the obj ect of faith. In no other wise does He 
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exist on earth, for it was only thus that He existed. 
That He shall come in glory is to be expected, but it 
can be expected and believed only by one who has 
attached himself and continues to hold fast to Him as 
He actually existed (1946, p. 387). 
We need a teacher like us if we are to become like the god, 
and therefore we need a god in time. 
Offense and Irrationality 
When one encounters the Absolute Paradox, Kierkegaard 
would allow only two responses: faith or offense. We have 
already discussed the former. Its alternative is offense. 
The offense is encountered in several areas. For instance, 
that the god should appear among us in time, incognito, in a 
state of suffering and humiliation is an offense to our 
desire for comfort and security. 
However, our purpose here is to look at the offense as 
it is related to our understanding. If the understanding is 
not set aside when the paradox is encountered, "then the 
relation is unhappy, and the understanding's unhappy love. 
we could more specifically term offense" (1985, p. 49). 
The understanding cannot accept the paradox; if it will not 
concede its boundaries it will become indignant to the 
suggestion that it has them. "Of course, those who, whether 
speculative philosophers of others, want to take everything 
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on reason, find the Paradox an offense; and so they will not 
make the leap of faith" (Croxall, 1948, p. 122). 
There are several related reasons why this should be 
the case. Primarily, the paradox, by definition, confronts 
us with a category, that our rationality cannot comprehend. 
Evans commented, "The paradox reveals i tself negatively to 
reason as the limit by involving reason in contradictions 
when it attempts to understand it" (1983, p. 225). How far 
Kierkegaard intends to push this is a question we will 
suspend momentarily. At the very least he believes that 
what we have encountered in the God-man is a reality no 
amount of analysis or speculation will yield any coherent 
content. "The offense remains outside the paradox, and the 
basis for that is: because it is absurd" (1985, p. 52). 
And is it not the nature reaction of the intellect to 
disregard what it cannot define, analyze, and systematize? 
Another reason why the understanding should respond 
negatively to the paradox, if we take this one step further, 
is the impossibility of historical proof. Not only can the 
what of the paradox not be comprehended, the that cannot be 
definitively shown through historical investigation. It can 
only be appropriated by faith. Again reason is by passed, 
and again it is offended. To the proposition that it would 
be actually possible, Kierkegaard responds 
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Is it possible to concei ve of a more foolish 
contradiction than that of wanting to PROVE (no matter 
for the present purpose whether it be from history or 
from anything else in the wide world one wants to prove 
it) that a definite individual man is God? That an 
individual man is God, declares himself to be God, is 
indeed the "offense," par excellence. But what is the 
offense, the offensive thing? What is at variance with 
(human) reason. And such a thing as that one would 
attempt to prove! ... One can "prove" only that it is 
at variance with reason (1946, p. 389). 
Here again we see Kierkegaard I s devaluation of the 
historical and rational in favor of faith. 
One final reason can be given for reason's reluctance 
to be bounded by the paradox, one which is the most subtle 
and most foundational, often underlying other obj ections. 
It must be remembered that the absolute difference between 
God and man is sin, and this is the fundamental reality 
separating the two, rather than any rational capacity. Man 
is intrinsically in untruth; this is a category into which 
he is placed. The penultimate basis of the offense is not 
rational or intellectual but moral. We do not accept it 
because we realize its demands are far too high for us; 
reason steps in to excuse our refusal to obey the divine 
directive. "[M]y, your, conviction (the personal) is 
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decisive. One can deal with reasons half jokingly: Well, 
if you insist on reasons I don't mind giving you some; do 
you want 3 or 5 or 7, how many do you want" (Kierkegaard, 
1960, p. 164). This is an obvious implication of 
Kierkegaard's doctrine of the subjectivity of truth, yet it 
is of crucial validity. At the core does not lie any kind 
of "esoteric metaphysical puzzles. We have trouble 
believing because we are selfish and we have trouble 
comprehending an action which is pure unselfishness" 
(Evans, 1989, p. 360). 
It might appear that Kierkegaard has completely severed 
any rationality whatsoever from religious life and faith. 
He certainly did not do much to counteract that accusation. 
That conclusion could easily be drawn from what we have 
already mentioned. Further statements are not uncommon in 
Kierkegaard; "How, then, does the learner become a believer 
or a follower? When the understanding is discharged and he 
receives the condition" (1985, p. 64), or "All this world-
historical to-do and arguments and proofs of the truth of 
Christianity must be discarded; the only proof there is, is 
Faith" (1960, p. 163). All of this has led many thinkers to 
picture Kierkegaard as "attempting to save religious belief 
by locating it in an enclave which is marked 'off limits' to 
reason" (Evans, 1989, p. 355). Francis Schaeffer's well-
known diagram displayed 
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non-reason, faith, and optimism 
upstairs, while reason and pessimism couched downstairs. 
However, it may be fruitful to re-examine this 
contention. It cannot be denied that Kierkegaard wanted to 
place definite boundaries around reason (Croxall, 1948, p. 
119) . The Hegelian idealism ~ vogue in his day submerged 
both God and the individual exister beneath its expansive 
system. Kierkegaard strongly wanted to curb this near 
deification of rationality and place the emphasis back on 
the needs of human beings. 
The crux lies at whether or not he thinks the 
incarnation is in fact a logical or formal contradiction in 
the sense that we use the term today. When we examine 
closely both Kierkegaard's writing and his intent, we begin 
to see how interpreters as we have discussed above may be 
mistaken. 
In the first place paradox, absurd, and contradiction 
are terms used by Kierkegaard which had different 
connotations than what current philosophy means when it 
refers to a logical or formal contradiction (Evans, 1989, p. 
350) . 
Further, one of Kierkegaard' s polemical pillars from 
which he launched his anti-Hegelian attacks was the law of 
non-contradiction (Evans, 1989, p. 351). There are real 
either/or choices which cannot be dialectically synthesized 
into a mediating alternative of both/and. 
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According to 
Hegel, contradictory propositions could be assimilated in a 
process of dialectics: thesis and antithesis assimilated 
into synthesis. Kierkegaard developed a hatred for this 
mediation, and attacked it even in the title of his book 
Either/Or. "Either/or,".a does not equal non-a; Kierkegaard 
cannot be the rampant irrationalist he is sometimes accused 
of when he so strongly employs the law of non-contradiction 
in his polemic. 
We may also wonder in what sense the incarnation is a 
paradox. What about it earned that title in Kierkegaard's 
eyes? Some commentators have been as emphatic as to say, 
"God's revelation in Christ is a 'fact' that refutes itself; 
it is a fact that cannot be a fact, and as an impossible 
fact, it is yet a fact" (Zuidema, 1980, p. 34). Others have 
so softened down the offense that it is lost altogether; 
"Is it not rather the paradox of love stooping to lowliness 
and rejection" (Brown, 1955, p. 70). A middle road seems 
best here. The incarnation cannot be a self-refuting event, 
yet it can occur in direct opposition to anything we could 
have thought possible apart from it actually happening. 
Theists often applaud the Greeks for their idea of god 
arrived at apart from revelation. Yet at best such a god 
was an impersonal, impassible, unmoved eternality completely 
incapable of passion, let alone action in time. The 
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incarnation contradicts not itself but our predetermined 
ideas of what God and man should be. 
C. S. Evans agrees with us on this point, although he 
stresses the moral aspect: 
The absolute paradox is that a person who is a 
particular, temporal individual and who therefore 
outwardly resembles other temporal individuals is 
nevertheless the full, complete realization of the 
eternal moral reality that provides the standard for 
all the rest of existence. It is this assertion 
that Climacus regards as "the strangest possible 
proposal" (1983, p. 228). 
Finally, 
understanding 
play in faith, 
Kierkegaard seems to believe that 
has a definite though subservient role to 
which is not contrary to it. "Yet the 
offense has one advantage: it points up the difference more 
clearly, for in that happy passion. . . the difference is in 
fact on good terms with the understanding" (1985, p. 54). 
For the believer, no such impossibility exists, because for 
him the incarnation has happened. If one considers the 
incarnation to be logically impossible a priori, then that 
one will certainly see Kierkegaard as an irrationalist. 
However, if one is already committed to the fact of the 
incarnation, and does not see this as necessarily 
conflicting with reason, then one may accept Kierkegaard as 
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something quite other than an anti-intellectual fideist. As 
Evans sums up, "Perhaps the best way of answering the 
question ... depends on what one means by reason" (1989, p. 
361) . 
If our hypothesis is correct, and Kierkegaard was not, 
strictly speaking an irrationalist, how does he differ from 
the view of Norman Geisler? Both see the incarnation as 
something beyond reason, with which reason is not 
necessarily in conflict. Or for that matter, Thomas Morris, 
who, to be sure, does not try to prove the incarnation at 
all, but rather attempts to show how the idea of God 
incarnate involves no logical contradiction. 
Kierkegaard would, most likely, view the attempts of 
these men as aborhent, perhaps even damaging to the faith 
rather than aiding it. Both thinkers are attempting to 
accommodate the claims of Christ, particularly his claim to 
divinity, to fashionable categories of thought. Their 
efforts focus on making an extremely difficult idea 
palatable to speculative philosophy and its rational 
categories. This method is completely antithetical to 
Kierkegaard, who his whole life re-worked Christianity to 
make it harder. When these men do admit that their is some 
factor at least in the incarnation which eludes or confounds 
reason, it is almost an embarrassment. They have attempted 
to dismiss the offense and make Christianity fasionable. 
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Human apprehension generally is very busy trying to 
understand, to understand more and more, but if, at 
the same time, it would take pains to understand 
itself, it simply has to establish the Paradox. The 
Paradox is not a concession, but a category (1960, p. 
158, emphasis mine) . 
By contrast, Morris begins his book with the quotation, "I 
know nothing so contemptible as a mere paradox" (G. K. 
Chesterton). Kierkegaard would have us proclaim what others 
would explain and, in the attempt, kill. 
Conclusions 
Kierkegaard's re-creation of Christianity has much to 
commend it. However, there are certain areas in which he 
fails to do justice to the biblical text or our experience 
of reality. In regard to the former, Kierkegaard in large 
measure renders the entire Old Testament irrelevant (to say 
nothing of the New) and therefore negates the prepatory 
work of God found so crucial by both Jesus and the 
apostles. Faith in the Absolute Paradox comes to the 
existing individual neither in history or by means of 
historical investigation. One commentator asked, "What 
becomes. of the long preparatio evanqelica in the 
history of Israel, as recorded in the Old Testament" (Brown, 
1965, p. 62). The rejection of Christ was not, in a sense, 
supposed to happen, for the Jews had a long tradition of God 
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working with them (or in spite of them) in time. 
Kierkegaard takes the revelation of God in Jesus Christ very 
seriously, but ironically his ideas about it lead to a 
depreciation of God's prior revelation. 
The second criticism concerns Kierkegaard's formulation 
of the doctrine of original sin, which he calls the absolute 
difference. Much has been said this century, notably by 
existential thinkers, about the "other-ness" of man in the 
world, his feeling of being thrown into a universe in which 
he is vaguely aware that something is fundamentally wrong 
with not only himself but also the order (or lack thereof) 
of things in general. This near universal malcontent offers 
an excellent existential meeting point between the gospel 
and modern man, for it appears to be just what the Christian 
doctrines of total depravity and original sin say should be 
the case. Yet as we have seen, Kierkegaard will not allow 
this. The understanding cannot absolutely negate itself to 
comprehend the absolute difference, and any knowledge of the 
difference must come from the God himself in the moment. 
Anything else is another form of immanence so strongly 
repudiated by Kierkegaard. 
However, even allowing for the shortcomings mentioned 
above, Kierkegaard has given us a "model," if we may so term 
it, of the incarnation much preferable to the others 
mentioned. The first consideration is obvious: We have 
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already critiqued the previous presentations and determined 
them to be lacking in adequate support. On this point 
Kierkegaard wins by default. 
Positively, Kierkegaard's formulation has two great 
strengths. In the first place, it preserves the 
transcendent nature of the Christian faith (Evans, 1983, p. 
240) . Religion in general and Christianity is particular 
has been increasingly seen as the activity of man, with no 
divine origin. This was every bit as true in Kierkegaard's 
day as it is in ours. Because man is in untruth, the truth 
must be brought to him from a source transcending himself, 
namely, the god. Christiani ty is not something that has 
arisen in man, but comes to him. 
But beyond this, Kierkegaard offers, contrary to the 
above philosophers, not merely a view but a challenge. 
Kierkegaard emphasizes a distinctly biblical note in 
declaring the paradox: the necessity of choosing to be for 
or against the god. The ontological and metaphisical 
prerequisites do not need to be thought out by human 
rationality, the God has appeared here among us. The time 
is not for speculation but action. "The highest of all is 
not to understand the highest but to act upon it" (1946, p. 
281). And who, after all, is convinced by these fine 
philosophical distinctions? Only those who claim to be 
already cornrni tted, those who respond to the paradox with 
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both faith and offense, and seek to dissolve the tension by 
explaining away the very foundation of what they believe. 
In the end, they have dismissed the offense, at least to 
their own minds, yet they have dismissed their faith as 
well. Kierkegaard reminds us that we are 
something that transcends our categories 
dealing with 
of thought; 
something that must come down to us because we cannot rise 
up to it; something that above all issues a challenge and 
calls us forth to commitment. 
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